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The Power of Banks and Governments

Author

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  • Reinke Raphael

    (Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, Zurich 8050, Switzerland)

Abstract

This article examines Cornelia Woll’s book on the “power of collective inaction” in which she argues that banks could extract favorable bailouts in the recent global financial crisis by remaining collectively inactive. Collective inaction forces governments to bear the brunt of the crisis resolutions. While this book provides an illuminating account of banking bailouts in several countries, its argument neglects the power of governments and of individual banks. Governments did not have to wait for banks’ (in)action but could impose punitive conditions on banks. And the resistance by banks did not originate from an incapacity to act collectively but from deliberate actions by individual banks to obstruct government intrusion. Rather than inaction on the part of banks, these interactions between governments and banks involved deliberate action and their outcome depended on more conventional notions of state-business power relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Reinke Raphael, 2016. "The Power of Banks and Governments," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 57-63, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:6:y:2016:i:1:p:57-63:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2016-0003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pepper D. Culpepper & Raphael Reinke, 2014. "Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States," Politics & Society, , vol. 42(4), pages 427-454, December.
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    3. Michele Lenza & Huw Pill & Lucrezia Reichlin, 2010. "Monetary policy in exceptional times [Preventing deflation: Lessons from Japan’s experience in the 1990s]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 25(62), pages 295-339.
    4. Cornett, Marcia Millon & McNutt, Jamie John & Strahan, Philip E. & Tehranian, Hassan, 2011. "Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 297-312, August.
    5. Congressional Budget Office, 2014. "Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program—April 2014," Reports 45260, Congressional Budget Office.
    6. Congressional Budget Office, 2014. "Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program—April 2014," Reports 45260, Congressional Budget Office.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huibers Fred, 2024. "Distributed Ledger Technology and the Future of Money and Banking: Banking is Necessary, Banks Are Not. Bill Gates 1994," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 213-249, May.

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