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The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning

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  • van ’t Klooster Jens

    (Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Abstract

Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically-grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.

Suggested Citation

  • van ’t Klooster Jens, 2024. "The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 519-532.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:14:y:2024:i:4:p:519-532:n:1004
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0074
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Monnet, 2018. "Controlling Credit. Central Banking and the Planned Economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02921743, HAL.
    2. Samuel Cheun & Isabel von Köppen-Mertes & Benedict Weller, 2009. "The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil," Occasional Paper Series 107, European Central Bank.
    3. Eric Monnet, 2021. "La Banque Providence. Démocratiser les banques centrales et la monnaie," Post-Print halshs-03434386, HAL.
    4. Cheun, Samuel & von Köppen-Mertes, Isabel & Weller, Benedict, 2009. "The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil," Occasional Paper Series 107, European Central Bank.
    5. Ioannidis, Michael & Murphy, Sarah Jane Hlásková & Zilioli, Chiara, 2021. "The mandate of the ECB: Legal considerations in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy review," Occasional Paper Series 276, European Central Bank.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Credit Council; Central Bank independence; democracy; credit policies; sustainable finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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