The Institutional Impetus to Social Waste in South Africa: A Note on Rent‐Seeking and the Margo Commission
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1813-6982.1987.tb01108.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
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