Product Market Integration and Union Collusion
This paper investigates the effects of product market integration on the incentives and scope for union collusion across borders. In the absence of binding agreements, the impact of this process on the unions' willingness to collude depends both on the degree of product market integration and on the degree of substitutability among traded goods. Where trade barriers across countries are relatively low, implicit cross-border collusion among unions is more difficult the more integrated are product markets and the less substitutable are traded goods. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Volume (Year): 15 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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