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Product Market Integration and Union Collusion

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  • Chiara Strozzi

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of product market integration on the incentives and scope for union collusion across borders. In the absence of binding agreements, the impact of this process on the unions’ willingness to collude depends both on the degree of product market integration and on the degree of substitutability among traded goods. Where trade barriers across countries are relatively low, implicit cross‐border collusion among unions is more difficult the more integrated are product markets and the less substitutable are traded goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiara Strozzi, 2007. "Product Market Integration and Union Collusion," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 17-36, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:15:y:2007:i:1:p:17-36
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00647.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carsten Eckel & Hartmut Egger, 2017. "The Dilemma of Labor Unions: Local Objectives vs Global Bargaining," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 534-566, August.
    2. Domenico Buccella, 2011. "International Production and Wage Coordination in an Integrated Economy (revised)," FIW Working Paper series 025, FIW.
    3. Domenico Buccella, 2011. "Labor unions and economic integration: A review," Económica, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 25-89, January-D.

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