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Fair‐Play Obligations: A Critical Note on Free Riding

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  • Stephen D. Parsons

Abstract

McDermott rejects the argument that an individual, in receiving benefits from a political community, thus incurs a ‘fair‐play obligation’ to contribute to the provision of these benefits. While acknowledging that an individual receiving benefits without contributing is ‘free riding’ and that free riding may be morally wrong, McDermott denies that such moral lapses entail communities having any right to demand support. Not contributing may be morally objectionable, but individuals may still have a right not to contribute. However, both proponents and opponents of the fair‐play obligation claim do not sufficiently differentiate between different forms of free riding. Arguments tend to be based on rights that may or may not be invoked when individuals free ride through consuming externalities. However, this form of free riding does not entail any reciprocal obligations. Yet it can plausibly be argued that when free riding occurs in the case of the production of public goods, then communities can demand support from individuals, and can have a right to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen D. Parsons, 2005. "Fair‐Play Obligations: A Critical Note on Free Riding," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(3), pages 641-649, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:3:p:641-649
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00548.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
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