Die Wettbewerbsanalyse von Nachfragemacht aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht
Based on recent developments in competition theory, we analyze key aspects of buyer power. The main perspective that we take is one where buyer power is treated as bilateral bargaining power. This represents a key difference from the more standard approach that views buyer power through the lenses of the monopsony model. We also discuss different ways to measure buyer power and analyze in detail its impact on the competitive process and consumers. Copyright 2008 die Autoren Journal compilation 2008, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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