IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/labour/v20y2006i2p383-391.html

How Incentives Increase Inequality

Author

Listed:
  • Maya Bacache‐Beauvallet

Abstract

. We determine the optimal level of bonuses in the case of Co‐production between an agent and multiusers. There is Co‐production when the outcome is the result of both the agent's effort and the user's effort and type. Paying bonuses to the agent encourages him to vary his effort according to the user he meets. This variety in the agent's effort results in an increase in inequality. Hence, the optimal level of bonuses is muted when the principal cares about equality among users. This is typically the case in education or health.

Suggested Citation

  • Maya Bacache‐Beauvallet, 2006. "How Incentives Increase Inequality," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(2), pages 383-391, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:20:y:2006:i:2:p:383-391
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00342.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00342.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00342.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2001. "Improving School Accountability Measures," NBER Working Papers 8156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Deon Filmer & James Habyarimana & Shwetlena Sabarwal, 2025. "Teacher Performance-Based Incentives and Learning Inequality," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 60(3), pages 812-856.
    2. Florence Audier & Maya Bacache-Beauvallet, 2007. "Emploi dans la fonction publique et fonctions « d'intérêt public ». Que nous apprennent les comparaisons internationales ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 323-350.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wo[ss]mann, Ludger & West, Martin, 2006. "Class-size effects in school systems around the world: Evidence from between-grade variation in TIMSS," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 695-736, April.
    2. Fernandes, Reynaldo & Gallego, Francisco A., 2008. "Comments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123125, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Angrist, Josh & Lavy, Victor, 2002. "The Effect of High School Matriculation Awards: Evidence from Randomized Trials," CEPR Discussion Papers 3827, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Eric A. Hanushek & John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin & Daniel M. O'Brien, 2005. "The Market for Teacher Quality," Discussion Papers 04-025, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    5. Theodore M. Crone, 2006. "Capitalization of the quality of local public schools: what do home buyers value?," Working Papers 06-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Jonah E. Rockoff, 2004. "The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 247-252, May.
    7. Raymundo M. Campos Vázquez & Freddy D. Urbina Romero, 2011. "Desempeño educativo en México: la prueba Enlace," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 26(2), pages 249-292.
    8. Jesse Rothstein, 2007. "Do Value-Added Models Add Value? Tracking, Fixed Effects, and Causal Inference," Working Papers 1036, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    9. Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
    10. Steven M. Glazerman & Liz Potamites, "undated". "False Performance Gains: A Critique of Successive Cohort Indicators," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 514ff0e4bc794e56804cafcc9, Mathematica Policy Research.
    11. Das, J. & Dercon, S. & Habyarimana, J. & Krishnan, P., 2004. "‘When Can School Inputs Improve Test Scores?’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0437, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Murnane, Richard J. & Levy, Frank, 2001. "Will Standards-Based Reforms Improve the Education of Students of Color?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 2), pages 401-16, June.
    13. repec:pri:cepsud:159rothstein is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hanushek, Eric A. & Raymond, Margaret E., 2001. "The Confusing World of Educational Accountability," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 2), pages 365-84, June.
    15. Joshua Angrist & Victor Lavy, 2003. "Achievement awards for high school matriculation: Evidence from randomized trials," Natural Field Experiments 00202, The Field Experiments Website.
    16. Murnane, Richard J. & Levy, Frank, 2001. "Will Standards-Based Reforms Improve the Education of Students of Color?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(2), pages 401-416, June.
    17. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Publications - Reports 8694, The World Bank Group.
    18. Bonesronning, Hans, 2004. "Can effective teacher behavior be identified?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 237-247, June.
    19. Chetty, Raj & Friedman, John & Rockoff, Jonah, 2015. "Measuring the Impacts of Teachers: Response to Rothstein (2014)," CEPR Discussion Papers 10768, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    20. World Bank, 2005. "Central America : Education Strategy Paper," World Bank Publications - Reports 8397, The World Bank Group.
    21. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2002. "The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 91-114, Fall.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:20:y:2006:i:2:p:383-391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csrotit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.