Endogenous Public Expenditures on Education
We construct a model of the determination of public funding of education through majority voting. Households have the option of privately supplementing public education. Alternatively, they can opt out of public education completely and choose private education. We find that in general the single-crossing property cannot be used to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. Numerical solutions of the model reveal (i) when public education inputs and private supplements are substitutes, private school enrollment is often zero; and (ii) the funding level for public education is very sensitive to the productivity of private supplements and the elasticity of substitution between public inputs and private supplements. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
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Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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