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Public Good Contributions Between Communities

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  • Chin Lim

Abstract

The four fundamental determinants of voluntary contributions to public goods are taste, community size, wealth, and wealth distribution. This paper argues that for policy purposes it is important to discriminate between the four hypotheses. To do this, it is necessary to consider the comparative static effects of the above determinants not only on total contribution, but also on per capita contribution and the participation rate. Furthermore, just as members of a smaller community would contribute more than their identical counterparts in a larger community, we show that members of a community that has more poor members would also contribute more than their identical counterparts in a community that has more rich members.

Suggested Citation

  • Chin Lim, 2003. "Public Good Contributions Between Communities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 541-548, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:3:p:541-548
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-Francois, 2007. "Commitment and matching contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1664-1683, September.

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