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On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions

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  • Daeyoung Jeong
  • Semin Kim

Abstract

This paper explores the concept of ex post stability in voting systems, shifting the focus from the traditional ex ante perspective, where preferences are uncertain, to a setting where agents' preferences are fully known. We offer a comprehensive characterization of ex post stable constitutions within deterministic voting rule environments. We bridge the theoretical gap between ex post and ex ante stability, shedding light on their intricate relationship and implications for the design and evolution of voting systems. Additionally, our research further evaluates the resilience of these constitutions to changes in the voting environment, particularly their flexibility in response to varying alternative rule sets. This study not only contributes to a deeper understanding of constitutional stability but also provides insights into the dynamics of collective decision‐making processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Daeyoung Jeong & Semin Kim, 2024. "On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:26:y:2024:i:4:n:e12707
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12707
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rae, Douglas W., 1969. "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 40-56, March.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    3. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
    4. Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin, 2023. "Stable constitutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 794-811.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hermida-Rivera, Héctor, 2025. "Minimal stable voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 541-553.
    2. Héctor Hermida‐Rivera & Toygar T. Kerman, 2025. "Binary Self‐Selective Voting Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(3), June.

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