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Presenting objects for random allocation

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  • Peng Liu
  • Sijia Xu

Abstract

For random allocation, whether a desirable rule exists or not hinges on the domain of agents' preferences, whose formation is affected by how objects are presented. We hence propose a model studying how to present objects so that the induced preference domain allows for designing a good rule. Motivated by practices in reality, we model the objects as combinations of several attribute values and a presentation of objects concerns a choice of presenting attributes and a ranking of them. Agents are assumed to formulate their preferences in a lexicographic manner according to the given presentation. We show that the domain of preferences induced by a presentation allows for a strategy‐proof, efficient, and envy‐free rule if and only if the presented attributes are conditionally binary.

Suggested Citation

  • Peng Liu & Sijia Xu, 2024. "Presenting objects for random allocation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:26:y:2024:i:4:n:e12705
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12705
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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