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Unit versus Ad Valorem Taxes in Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly

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  • HARVEY E. LAPAN
  • DAVID A. HENNESSY

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  • Harvey E. Lapan & David A. Hennessy, 2011. "Unit versus Ad Valorem Taxes in Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 125-138, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:1:p:125-138
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    22. Alpizar, Francisco & Carlsson, Fredrik & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2005. "How much do we care about absolute versus relative income and consumption?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 405-421.
    23. Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-478, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo Goerke & Frederik Herzberg & Thorsten Upmann, 2012. "Failure of Ad Valorem and Specific Tax Equivalence under Uncertainty," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201205, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    2. Hiroshi Aiura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2016. "Indirect Taxes in the Cross-border Shopping Model: A Monopolistic Competition Approach," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1014, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Aiura, Hiroshi & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2013. "Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 30-38.
    4. Laszlo Goerke & Frederik Herzberg & Thorsten Upmann, 2014. "Failure of ad valorem and specific tax equivalence under uncertainty," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 387-402, December.
    5. Hikaru Ogawa & Hiroshi Aiura, 2012. "Unit Tax versus Ad Valorem Tax: A Tax Competition Model with Cross-border Shopping," ERSA conference papers ersa12p428, European Regional Science Association.
    6. repec:kap:jeczfn:v:122:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-017-0538-4 is not listed on IDEAS

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