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Stability of Constitutions

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  • KLAUS KULTTI
  • PAAVO MIETTINEN

Abstract

Constitution is a pair of rules (s, S) that are used in a voting situation. The rule s is used to vote about the existing alternatives and the rule S is used to vote about changing the rule s to some other rule s′. We consider what kind of constitutions are likely to emerge as prominent ones if the constitutions contain more than just two rules. In a constitution that contains any number of rules the nth rule is used to decide about the n − 1 th rule. We define a notion of stability for the constitutions and show that all stable constitutions roughly contain the same rule from n = 2 onwards. This is one explanation to the casual observation that the constitutions have usually only two rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Kultti & Paavo Miettinen, 2009. "Stability of Constitutions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 891-896, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:891-896
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01434.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
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    Cited by:

    1. Héctor Hermida‐Rivera & Toygar T. Kerman, 2025. "Binary Self‐Selective Voting Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(3), June.
    2. Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin, 2023. "Stable constitutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 794-811.
    3. Takahiro Suzuki & Stefano Moretti & Michele Aleandri, 2025. "Ranking alternatives from opinions on criteria," Papers 2504.06676, arXiv.org.
    4. Hermida-Rivera, Héctor, 2025. "Minimal stable voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 541-553.
    5. Azrieli, Yaron & Kim, Semin, 2016. "On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 376-389.
    6. Takahiro Suzuki & Masahide Horita, 2023. "A Society Can Always Decide How to Decide: A Proof," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 987-1023, October.

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