IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v70y2022i3p752-774.html

Inefficient Screening in Online Rental Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Irina Kirysheva
  • Vladyslav Nora

Abstract

We study a home rental market where hosts compete in prices and decide which guests to accept. Such screening results in inefficiently many rejections and can reduce welfare. In a unique symmetric equilibrium, hosts randomize over prices so that it may be unprofitable for them to accept some efficient trades. Moreover, every equilibrium is inefficient when there are few hosts. We further show that screening increases welfare when there are enough hosts or when the potential loss of surplus from inefficient trades is high. We discuss the implications of our findings to online platforms such as Airbnb and HomeAway.

Suggested Citation

  • Irina Kirysheva & Vladyslav Nora, 2022. "Inefficient Screening in Online Rental Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 752-774, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:3:p:752-774
    DOI: 10.1111/joie.12299
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12299
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/joie.12299?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June.
    2. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2006. "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Working Papers 2006-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    3. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, 2017. "Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-22, April.
    4. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2018. "Patterns of Competition with Captive Customers," MPRA Paper 90362, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Jeremy M. Burke & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. "Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets: An Application to the US Mortgage Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 65-106, November.
    6. Rishi Ahuja & Ronan C. Lyons, 2017. "The Silent Treatment: LGBT Discrimination in the Sharing Economy," Trinity Economics Papers tep1917, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    7. Ruomeng Cui & Jun Li & Dennis J. Zhang, 2020. "Reducing Discrimination with Reviews in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1071-1094, March.
    8. Jin-Hyuk Kim & Liad Wagman, 2015. "Screening incentives and privacy protection in financial markets: a theoretical and empirical analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
    2. Sandro Shelegia & Chris M. Wilson, 2014. "A Utility-Based Model of Sales with Informative Advertising," Vienna Economics Papers vie1406, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    3. Mateusz Myśliwski & May Rostom, 2022. "Value of information, search, and competition in the UK mortgage market," Bank of England working papers 967, Bank of England.
    4. Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L. & Wildenbeest, Matthijs R., 2011. "Comparison sites," IESE Research Papers D/933, IESE Business School.
      • Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 2011. "Comparison Sites," Working Papers 2011-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    5. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2022. "Patterns of Competitive Interaction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 153-191, January.
    6. Rosa Branca Esteves, 2009. "Customer Poaching And Advertising," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 112-146, March.
    7. Kas, Judith & Delnoij, Joyce & Corten, Rense & Parigi, Paolo, 2022. "Trust spillovers in the sharing economy: Does international Airbnb experience foster cross‐national trust?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 21(3), pages 509-522.
    8. Martin, Simon & Rasch, Alexander, 2022. "Collusion by algorithm: The role of unobserved actions," DICE Discussion Papers 382, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    9. Ya-Ling Chiu & Jiangze Du & Jying-Nan Wang, 2022. "The Effects of Price Dispersion on Sales in the Automobile Industry: A Dynamic Panel Analysis," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(3), pages 21582440221, August.
    10. Zekun Liu & Dennis J. Zhang & Fuqiang Zhang, 2021. "Information Sharing on Retail Platforms," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 606-619, May.
    11. Carlin, Bruce I., 2009. "Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 278-287, March.
    12. Sandro Shelegia & Chris M Wilson, 2014. "A Utility-Based Model of Sales with Informative Advertising," Discussion Paper Series 2014_09, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Oct 2014.
    13. Arnold, Michael A. & Zhang, Lan, 2014. "The unique equilibrium in a model of sales with costly advertising," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 457-460.
    14. Gaddis, S. Michael & DiRago, Nicholas V., 2021. "Audit Studies of Housing in the United States: Established, Emerging, and Future Research," SocArXiv fn4ta, Center for Open Science.
    15. Rauh, Michael T., 2009. "Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 959-978, July.
    16. Maarten Janssen & Paul Pichler & Simon Weidenholzer, 2009. "Sequential Search with Incompletely Informed Consumers: Theory and Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," Vienna Economics Papers vie0914, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    17. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2021. "Search, Information, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(8), pages 2275-2319.
    18. Dieter Pennerstorfer & Philipp Schmidt‐Dengler & Nicolas Schutz & Christoph Weiss & Biliana Yontcheva, 2020. "Information And Price Dispersion: Theory And Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(2), pages 871-899, May.
    19. Michael R. Baye & J. Rupert J. Gatti & Paul Kattuman & John Morgan, 2006. "Did the Euro Foster Online Price Competition? Evidence from an International Price Comparison Site," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(2), pages 265-279, April.
    20. McCarthy, Ian M., 2016. "Advertising intensity and welfare in an equilibrium search model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 20-26.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:3:p:752-774. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.