Asymmetric Market Shares, Advertising And Pricing: Equilibrium With An Information Gatekeeper
We analyze the impact of market share on advertising and pricing decisions by firms that sell to loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through an information intermediary or "gatekeeper." In equilibrium the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market, and there is no equilibrium in which both firms advertise with probability 1. The results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes all prices are revealed to shoppers and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as Shopper.com.
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Volume (Year): 59 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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- Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 2002. "Information gatekeepers and price discrimination on the internet," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 47-51, June.
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- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2004.
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2004-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2004. "Price Dispersion In The Small And In The Large: Evidence From An Internet Price Comparison Site," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 463-496, December.
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- Narasimhan, Chakravarthi, 1988. "Competitive Promotional Strategies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(4), pages 427-49, October.
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