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Informative Advertising Competition


  • LeBlanc, Greg


This paper investigates informative price advertising in an established-product Hotelling duopoly where firms compete for shares of a fixed market. Prices are uncertain because firms' costs are private information. For a sufficiently low cost of advertising, advertising necessarily arises in equilibrium. Also, the less balanced the initial distributions over costs, the greater the potential for informative advertising. Moreover, whenever firms use informative advertising, it increases the firms' expected profits, and social welfare, relative to the outcome without advertising. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Suggested Citation

  • LeBlanc, Greg, 1998. "Informative Advertising Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 63-77, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:46:y:1998:i:1:p:63-77

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    10. Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, 1983. "Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 315-325, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Bing & Chouinard, Hayley H., 2014. "Product quality, advertising intensity and market size," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 215-218.
    2. Uwe Dulleck & Paul Frijters & Konrad Podczeck, 2006. "All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance," Economics working papers 2006-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    3. Nilssen,T. & Sorgard,L., 2000. "Strategic informative advertising in a TV-advertising duopoly," Memorandum 17/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    4. Zakaria Babutsidze, 2009. "Learning How to Consume and Returns to Product Promotion," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-05, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    5. Oksana Loginova, 2005. "Competing for Customers' Attention: Advertising When Consumers Have Imperfect Memory," Working Papers 0510, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 15 Dec 2006.
    6. Stivers, Andrew & Tremblay, Victor J., 2005. "Advertising, search costs, and social welfare," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 317-333, July.

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