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Labour market enforcement in the 21st century: should whistleblowers have a greater role?

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  • David Lewis

Abstract

Labour market enforcement can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms. On the basis that inspectorates in the UK have been under‐resourced historically and that reliance on self‐regulation is particularly objectionable in sectors that have a record of providing low pay and poor working conditions, this article explores the potential for using whistleblowing by both workers and non‐workers as a method of enforcing labour standards. The author believes that, in principle, policing by inspectors working in conjunction with unions is particularly important in industries where small firms are prevalent and individuals may feel particularly vulnerable to retaliation if they speak up. Nevertheless, given the low likelihood of government inspections and low levels of unionisation in the private sector, it is suggested that enhancing the protection given to whistleblowers who report suspected wrongdoing might deter employer non‐compliance and prove cost effective.

Suggested Citation

  • David Lewis, 2019. "Labour market enforcement in the 21st century: should whistleblowers have a greater role?," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 256-276, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:indrel:v:50:y:2019:i:3:p:256-276
    DOI: 10.1111/irj.12251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:eme:ijlma0:ijlma-10-2014-0056 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Yehonatan Givati, 2016. "A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 43-72.
    3. David WEIL, 2008. "A strategic approach to labour inspection," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 147(4), pages 349-375, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alan Hall & Rebecca Hall & Nicole Bernhardt, 2022. "Dealing with ‘vulnerable workers’ in precarious employment: Front-line constraints and strategies in employment standards enforcement," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 43(1), pages 469-494, February.
    2. Orestis Papadopoulos & Marti Lopez‐Andreu & Mandi Jamalian, 2021. "Violation and lack of awareness of employment rights in the United Kingdom's hotel industry: Isolation, fragmentation and barriers to labour enforcement," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 315-330, July.
    3. Ioannis Kampourakis, 2021. "Whistleblowers as regulatory intermediaries: Instrumental and reflexive considerations in decentralizing regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 745-759, July.

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