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Interest Group Lobbying and the Delegation of Policy Authority

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  • Randolph Sloof

Abstract

In a signalling model of lobbying the politicians' decision whether to delegate policy authority and an interest group's choice between lobbying politicians or bureaucrats are investigated. Only bureaucrats are able to assess policy-relevant information coming from the interest group, but their interests may differ from those of politicians. In equilibrium politicians weigh the benefits of an informed policy decision against bureaucratic drift. We obtain that delegation occurs only when the bureaucracy is not too much biased and when the stakes of the interest group are not too high. Still, politicians sometimes prefer a biased bureaucracy and the interest group to have a larger stake. The model also predicts that interest groups typically lobby politicians to further delegation. Copyright 2000 Royal Statistical Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Randolph Sloof, 2000. "Interest Group Lobbying and the Delegation of Policy Authority," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 247-274, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:247-274
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    Cited by:

    1. Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2013. "Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator’s Objective," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 563-594, August.
    2. Mazza, Isidoro & van Winden, Frans, 2008. "An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-149, January.
    3. Norbert Walter & Steffen Kern, 2011. "Politikberatung im EU-Finanzbinnenmarkt: vom Lamfalussy-Prozess zur europäischen Aufsicht," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(1), pages 91-105.
    4. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
    5. Roland Königsgruber, 2013. "Expertise-based lobbying and accounting regulation," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 1009-1025, November.
    6. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
    7. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.

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