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Dictatorship, Liberalism Andthe Pareto Rule: Possible And Impossible

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  • Branislav Boričić

Abstract

The current economic crisis has shaken belief in the capacity of neoliberal ‘ free market’ policies. Numerous supports of state intervention have arisen, and the interest for social choice theory has revived. In this paper we consider three standard properties for aggregating individual into social preferences: dictatorship, liberalism and the Pareto rule, and their formal negations. The context of the pure first-order classical logic makes it possible to show how some combinations of the above mentioned conditions, under the hypothesis of unrestricted domain, form simple and reasonable examples of possible or impossible social choice systems. Due to their simplicity, these examples, including the famous ‘liberal paradox’, could have a particular didactic value.

Suggested Citation

  • Branislav Boričić, 2009. "Dictatorship, Liberalism Andthe Pareto Rule: Possible And Impossible," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 54(181), pages 45-54, April – J.
    • Handle: RePEc:beo:journl:v:54:y:2009:i:181:p:45-54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    3. Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    (non)dictatorship; (non)liberalism; (non)Pareto rule; (in)consistency; (im)possibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

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