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Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Bodil O. Hansen

    (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)

  • Hans Keiding

    (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)

Abstract

We consider a simple model of international trade under uncertainty, where production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. The riskiness of production depends on the choices of the producers, not observable to the general public, and these choices are influenced by the availability and cost of credit. If investment is financed by a bond market, then a situation may arise where otherwise identical countries end up with different levels of interest and different choices of technique, which again implies differences in achieved level of welfare. Under suitable conditions on the parameters of the model, the market may not be able to supply credits to one of the countries. The introduction of financial intermediaries with the ability to control the debtors may change this situation in a direction which is welfare improving (in a suitable sense) by increasing expected output in the country with high interest rates, while opening up for new problems of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring activity of the banks

Suggested Citation

  • Bodil O. Hansen & Hans Keiding, 2004. "Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard, And Pareto Inferior Trade," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 5(2), pages 189-219.
  • Handle: RePEc:anp:econom:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:189-219
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    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/revista/vol5/vol5n2p189_219.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, January.
    3. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    4. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke & Pattillo, Catherine, 1999. "Flight capital as a portfolio choice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2066, The World Bank.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    6. Michael Mussa, 2002. "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Peterson Institute Press: Policy Analyses in International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa67, February.
    7. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    8. Sturzenegger, Federico, 1997. "Understanding the welfare implications of currency substitution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 391-416.
    9. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    10. Clark, Ephraim & Jokung, Octave, 1998. "Risk Aversion, Wealth and International Capital Flows," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 507-515, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital Outflow; Financial Intermediaries; Moral Hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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