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Dlaczego reżimy rodzą się i trwają? Białoruś a teoria Acemoglu i Robinsona

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  • Pieczewski, Andrzej
  • Sidarava, Aliaksandra

Abstract

The Eastern European state of Belarus, a former Soviet republic, is classified as a pure autocracy, and 2024 marks three decades since its strongman leader Alexander Lukashenko came to power. Over the years, Lukashenko has created a unique type of economy synergistic with the political system and known as “state capitalism.” In this paper, we refer to the theories of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson to explore the factors and institutions that facilitated Lukashenko’s rise to power and ensure the durability of the Belarusian authoritarian system. We found that the case of Belarus is unique and holds relevance for post-Soviet studies, deviating in some respects from Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory, especially regarding the dictator’s ascent to power and the factors sustaining the system. We hypothesise that culture and mental models were crucial for Lukashenko to take power, while the system’s persistence is, in large part, due to the dictator’s external protector, Russia. We use historical analysis and evaluate economic and institutional development indicators.

Suggested Citation

  • Pieczewski, Andrzej & Sidarava, Aliaksandra, 2024. "Dlaczego reżimy rodzą się i trwają? Białoruś a teoria Acemoglu i Robinsona," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2024(1), March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:360587
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.360587
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters, in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press.
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