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A Dynamic Model of Mesh Size Regulatory Compliance

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  • Akpalu, Wisdom

Abstract

This paper employs a dynamic model for crimes that involve time and punishment to analyze the use of a net with illegal mesh size in a management regime where each community claims territorial use right over a fishery but has a discount rate that may differ from the social discount rate. The equilibrium stock and harvest levels are found to be much lower if the regulation is violated. Moreover, the optimal penalty for violation must be decreasing in the shadow cost of taking the risk to fish illegally, and increasing the risk of punishment increases the equilibrium stock level.

Suggested Citation

  • Akpalu, Wisdom, 2010. "A Dynamic Model of Mesh Size Regulatory Compliance," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 35(1), pages 1-17.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:61059
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.61059
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61059/files/JARE_Apr2010__03_pp34-50.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. M. Garza-Gil, 1998. "ITQ Systems in Multifleet Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(1), pages 79-92, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barr, Rhona F. & Mourato, Susana, 2014. "Investigating fishers' preferences for the design of marine Payments for Environmental Services schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 91-103.
    2. Akpalu, Wisdom, 2011. "Determinants of noncompliance with light attraction regulation among inshore fishers in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 172-177, April.
    3. Rhona Barr & Susana Mourato, 2012. "Investigating fishers� preferences for the design of marine Payments for Environmental Services schemes," GRI Working Papers 101, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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