The Economics Of Insuring Crops Against Drought
The necessary conditions for the existence of a financially viable crop insurance scheme against drought are examined. A supply and demand model for crop insurance is developed which identifies the parameters that are critical to the efficiency of such a scheme. The values of these parameters are estimated by using data from the Australian wheat industry. It is found that crop insurance against drought would appear to be unattractive from an efficiency point of view.
Volume (Year): 28 (1984)
Issue (Month): 01 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 0409 032 338
Web page: http://www.aares.info/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Freebairn, John W., 1978. "Pros And Cons Of Temporary Industry Assistance," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 22(02-03).
- Quiggin, John C. & Anderson, Jock R., 1979.
"Stabilisation And Risk Reduction In Australian Agriculture,"
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 23(03), December.
- John C. Quiggin & Jock R. Anderson, 1979. "Stabilisation And Risk Reduction In Australian Agriculture," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 23(3), pages 191-206, December.
- Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010.
"Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2069, David K. Levine.
- Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
- Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ajaeau:22590. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.