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Fairness Measures and Importance Weights for Allocating Quotas to OPEC Member Countries

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  • Ahmad Saleh Alsalem
  • Subhash C. Sharma
  • Marvin D. Troutt

Abstract

This study considers what we call the "degree of optimality" of quota assignments for each OPEC member country based on certain proposed fairness "factors. We argue that these factors should ideally be based on energy and economic conditions that ought to be taken into consideration when production quotas are assigned. Thus, in this study, importance weights based on proven reserves, available productive capacity, GDP per capita and domestic investment needs are first obtained for allocating fair quotas to each member country in the period 1982-1990. Then a degree of fairness optimality index is computed for each member country and is applied to measure the performance of these countries during the quota system period. Our investigations reveal that OPEC appears to give greater importance to the energy factors, proved reserves and productive capacity, although domestic investment needs seem to play a significant role in determining the direction of quota assignments. Statistical tests reveal that all the weights are consistent over time. Finally, we observe that the member countries whose ideal quotas are based on low GDP per capita have higher degrees of optimality than those whose ideal quotas are based on proven reserves or available productive capacity. The computed importance weights and optimality measures can be used both by OPEC and energy analysts interested in OPEC behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmad Saleh Alsalem & Subhash C. Sharma & Marvin D. Troutt, 1997. "Fairness Measures and Importance Weights for Allocating Quotas to OPEC Member Countries," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 1-21.
  • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1997v18-02-a01
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gault, John & Spierer, Charles & Bertholet, Jean-Luc & Karbassioun, Bahman, 1999. "How does OPEC allocate quotas?," Journal of Energy Finance & Development, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 137-148.
    2. Berthod, Mathias & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2019. "On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: A cooperative differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 23-39.
    3. Ramcharran, Harri, 2001. "OPEC's production under fluctuating oil prices: further test of the target revenue theory," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 667-681, November.
    4. Kaufmann, Robert K. & Bradford, Andrew & Belanger, Laura H. & Mclaughlin, John P. & Miki, Yosuke, 2008. "Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 333-351, March.
    5. Alhajji, A. F. & Huettner, David, 2000. "OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(15), pages 1151-1164, December.
    6. Mahmoud Al‐Osaimy & Aziz Yahyai, 2003. "The importance of weighted variables to OPEC's production quota allocation," OPEC Energy Review, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, vol. 27(2), pages 129-141, June.
    7. Ramcharran, Harri, 2002. "Oil production responses to price changes: an empirical application of the competitive model to OPEC and non-OPEC countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 97-106, March.
    8. Holland, Margaret B. & de Koning, Free & Morales, Manuel & Naughton-Treves, Lisa & Robinson, Brian E. & Suárez, Luis, 2014. "Complex Tenure and Deforestation: Implications for Conservation Incentives in the Ecuadorian Amazon," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 21-36.
    9. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric, 2016. "Imperfect cartelization in OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 333-344.

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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