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Symposium on the Economics of Liability

Author

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  • Carl Shapiro

Abstract

Has the U.S. liability system run amok? Many commentators feel it has, as do many executives who feel that the liability "tax" discourages innovation and ultimately fails to promote safety. On the other hand, economists have ceaselessly pointed out that when one party is made liable for injury caused to another, an externality has been internalized. This symposium is intended to clarify just what economists know about the U.S. liability system: its worth as well as its flaws. The resulting picture is not a pretty one. Often liability is imposed on injurers as a means of compensating and insuring victims, despite the fact that such compensation and insurance could be accomplished much more effectively using direct accident insurance. Liability is an expensive means of providing compensation, since the legal liability system involves large transaction costs, mainly in the form of litigation expenses. Overall, America's institutions for assigning liability are poorly designed to promote economic efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Carl Shapiro, 1991. "Symposium on the Economics of Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 3-10, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:5:y:1991:i:3:p:3-10
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.3.3
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.5.3.3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, 1994. "Insurance Rationing and the Origins of Workers' Compensation," NBER Working Papers 4943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On tort as an implicit insurance system with state-dependent utility: The case of child mortality risk," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 449-459, December.
    3. Bachmeier, Lance & Gaughan, Patrick & Swanson, Norman R., 2004. "The volume of federal litigation and the macroeconomy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 191-207, June.
    4. Frenzen, Paul D. & Buzby, Jean C. & Rasco, Barbara, 2001. "Product Liability And Microbial Foodborne Illness," Agricultural Economic Reports 34059, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    5. Sjur Didrik Flåm & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2015. "Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 943-963, December.
    6. Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2014. "The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100452, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2015. "The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting on Tort Reforms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 357-384.
    8. Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2013. "Do Lawyer-Legislators Protect Their Business? Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms," Working papers 2013/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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