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Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation in Standards Development

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  • Bernhard Ganglmair
  • Timothy Simcoe
  • Emanuele Tarantino

Abstract

Using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a voluntary organization that develops protocols for managing internet infrastructure, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to continue or abandon a line of research. The model's key parameters measure the speed at which authors learn whether their project will become a technology standard. We use the model to simulate two innovation policies: an R&D subsidy and a publication prize. While subsidies have a larger impact on research output, the optimal policy depends on the level of R&D spillovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard Ganglmair & Timothy Simcoe & Emanuele Tarantino, 2025. "Learning When to Quit: An Empirical Model of Experimentation in Standards Development," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 164-190, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:164-90
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190321
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Simcoe, 2012. "Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 305-336, February.
    2. Michael Roach & Wesley M. Cohen, 2013. "Lens or Prism? Patent Citations as a Measure of Knowledge Flows from Public Research," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 504-525, October.
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    1. is not listed on IDEAS
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    3. Baron, Justus, 2020. "Counting standard contributions to measure the value of patent portfolios - A tale of apples and oranges," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(3).
    4. Baron, Justus & Kanevskaia, Olia, 2023. "Wearing multiple hats—The role of working group chairs’ affiliation in standards development," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(9).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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