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Dynamic Incentives and Permit Market Equilibrium in Cap-and-Trade Regulation

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  • Yuta Toyama

Abstract

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of emissions abatement, investment, and permit trading with banking under cap-and-trade regulation. The model accounts for forward-looking behavior and transaction costs in the permit market, which determine the temporal and geographical distribution of emissions in equilibrium and, thus, the welfare implications of the regulation. The model is applied to the US Acid Rain Program to evaluate the role of regulatory designs. Permit banking mitigates inefficiencies arising from transaction costs and modifies the timing of emissions. An emissions tax policy could achieve an outcome close to dynamic cap and trade without transaction costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuta Toyama, 2024. "Dynamic Incentives and Permit Market Equilibrium in Cap-and-Trade Regulation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 374-423, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:374-423
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190377
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    Cited by:

    1. Baudry, Marc & Faure, Anouk & Quemin, Simon, 2021. "Emissions trading with transaction costs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    2. Pahle, Michael & Quemin, Simon & Osorio, Sebastian & Günther, Claudia & Pietzcker, Robert, 2025. "The emerging endgame: The EU ETS on the road towards climate neutrality," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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