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Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen D. Williamson

Abstract

A model is constructed in which households and banks have incentives to fake the quality of collateral. These incentive problems matter when collateral is scarce in the aggregate—when real interest rates are low. Conventional monetary easing can exacerbate these problems, in that the misrepresentation of collateral becomes more profitable, thus increasing haircuts and interest rate differentials. Central bank purchases of private mortgages may not be feasible, due to misrepresentation of asset quality. If feasible, central bank asset purchase programs work by circumventing suboptimal fiscal policy, not by mitigating incentive problems in asset markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen D. Williamson, 2018. "Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 202-233, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:202-33
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20150035
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    Cited by:

    1. Williamson, Stephen D., 2022. "Central bank digital currency and flight to safety," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    2. Liu, Yu-Chen & Li, Yiting, 2024. "Corporate finance, collateralized borrowing, and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    3. Kang, Kee-Youn, 2021. "Optimal contract for asset trades: Collateralizing or selling?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    4. Williamson, Stephen, 2024. "Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    5. Andolfatto, David & Williamson, Stephen, 2015. "Scarcity of safe assets, inflation, and the policy trap," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 70-92.
    6. Stephen Williamson, 2019. "Neo-Fisherism and inflation control," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 52(3), pages 882-913, August.
    7. Fatih Tuluk, 2021. "Collateral Misrepresentation, External Auditing, and Optimal Supervisory Policy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 975-1016, November.
    8. Kee-Youn Kang, 2019. "Central Bank purchases of private assets: An evaluation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 326-346, January.
    9. Stephen Williamson, 2019. "Low real interest rates and the zero lower bound," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 36-62, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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