Guaranteeing Individual Accounts
Global aging is prompting workers and taxpayers everywhere to recognize their vulnerability to the inherent uncertainty of unfunded social-security systems. This has generated an international wave of social-security reforms over the last two decades, prompting more than 20 countries to establish Individual Account (IA) plans. In the United States, the idea of Individual Accounts has attracted recent interest with the release of the Final Report of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (CSSS): here, voluntary individual accounts were proposed as a key element of a reformed national old-age system (see Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 2001; John F. Cogan and Mitchell, 2003). Strengths of IA's include the fact that participants gain ownership in their accounts and diversify their pension investments; nevertheless, IA participants also must bear capital-market risk. Recent market volatility has reminded investors of the importance of capital-market fluctuations and their potential impact on retirement income. In response, some policymakers have suggested that "guarantees" be designed to help protect IA investments. Abroad, such guarantees have been adopted in several Latin American countries undergoing reform, and most recently, in Japan and Germany (Mitchell and Kent Smetters, 2003). Sensible public policy recommending the adoption of guarantees must identify their costs and who will pay for them. In this paper, we discuss how to evaluate such costs in the context of a social-security reform that includes IA's, along with ways to finance them.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Feldstein & Elena Ranguelova, 2001.
"Accumulated Pension Collars: A Market Approach to Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform,"
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 15, pages 149-166
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Feldstein & Elena Ranguelova, 2000. "Accumulated Pension Collars: A Market Approach to Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform," NBER Working Papers 7861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Smetters, Kent, 2002.
"Controlling the cost of minimum benefit guarantees in public pension conversions,"
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 9-33, March.
- Kent Smetters, 2002. "Controlling the Cost of Minimum Benefit Guarantees in Public Pension Conversions," NBER Working Papers 8732, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marie-Eve Lachance & Olivia S. Mitchell, 2002.
"Understanding Individual Account Guarantees,"
NBER Working Papers
9195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001.
NBER Working Papers
8451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John F. Cogan & Olivia S. Mitchell, 2003. "Perspectives from the President's Commission on Social Security Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 149-172, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:257-260. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)or (Michael P. Albert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.