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Why Being Wrong Can Be Right: Magical Warfare Technologies and the Persistence of False Beliefs

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  • Nathan Nunn
  • Raul Sanchez de la Sierra

Abstract

Across human societies, one sees many examples of deeply rooted and widely held beliefs that are almost certainly untrue. Examples include beliefs about witchcraft, magic, ordeals, and superstitions. Why are such incorrect beliefs so prevalent and how do they persist? We consider this question through an examination of superstitions and magic associated with conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Focusing on superstitions related to bullet-proofing, we provide theory and case-study evidence showing how these incorrect beliefs persist. Although harmful at the individual-level, we show that they generate Pareto efficient outcomes that have group-level benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan Nunn & Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, 2017. "Why Being Wrong Can Be Right: Magical Warfare Technologies and the Persistence of False Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 582-587, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:582-87
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171091
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
    2. Gershman, Boris, 2016. "Witchcraft beliefs and the erosion of social capital: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 182-208.
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    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Delissaint, Diego & Fourati, Maleke & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa & Seabright, Paul, 2021. "Betting on the lord: Lotteries and religiosity in Haiti," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    2. Hajikhameneh, Aidin & Iannaccone, Laurence R., 2023. "God games: An experimental study of uncertainty, superstition, and cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 88-116.
    3. Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared & Iyer, Sriya & Shrivastava, Anand, 2020. "Culture and colonial legacy: Evidence from public goods games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 107-129.
    4. Emmanuelle Auriol & Julie Lassébie & Amma Panin & Eva Raiber & Paul Seabright, 2020. "God Insures those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(4), pages 1799-1848.
    5. Olsson, Ola & Baaz, Maria Eriksson & Martinsson, Peter, 2020. "Fiscal capacity in “post”-conflict states: Evidence from trade on Congo river," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Naci H. Mocan & Han Yu, 2017. "Can Superstition Create a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? School Outcomes of Dragon Children of China," NBER Working Papers 23709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Invernizzi, Giovanna M. & Miller, Joshua B. & Coen, Tommaso & Dufwenberg, Martin & Oliveira, Luiz Edgard R., 2021. "Tra i Leoni: Revealing the preferences behind a superstition," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    8. Murat Iyigun & Jared Rubin, 2017. "The Ideological Roots of Institutional Change," Working Papers 17-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Nik Stoop & Marijke Verpoorten, 2020. "Risk, Envy and Magic in the Artisanal Mining Sector of South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 51(5), pages 1199-1224, September.
    10. Neha Deopa & Daniele Rinaldo, 2023. "Sacred Ecology: The Environmental Impact of African Traditional Religions," Papers 2401.13673, arXiv.org.
    11. Alidou, Sahawal & Verpoorten, Marijke, 2019. "Only women can whisper to gods: Voodoo, menopause and women’s autonomy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 40-54.
    12. Kaplan,Oliver Ross, 2022. "Superstitions and Civilian Displacement : Evidence from the Colombian Conflict," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10023, The World Bank.
    13. David Bilungule Bakamana & Laurenti Magesa & Clement Majawa, 2021. "Efficacy of indigenous charms as weapons of war: Evidence from the Kamwina Nsapu conflict of Kasai in the Democratic Republic Of Congo," International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 10(7), pages 408-417, October.
    14. Boris Gershman, 2021. "Witchcraft Beliefs, Social Relations, and Development," Working Papers 2021-01, American University, Department of Economics.
    15. Gershman, Boris, 2020. "Witchcraft beliefs as a cultural legacy of the Atlantic slave trade: Evidence from two continents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    16. Ennio E Piano & Byron B Carson, 2020. "Scalp-taking," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(1), pages 40-66, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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