Heuristics and Heterogeneity in Health Insurance Exchanges: Evidence from the Massachusetts Connector
We examine heuristic decision rules in consumer choice on health insurance exchanges using data from the Massachusetts Connector. Consumers may have difficulty making optimal choices in a complex environment. The heuristic "choose the cheapest plan" is suggested by the decision context, previous research, and the data: about 20% of enrollees choose the cheapest plan possible. We find evidence of this heuristic in many models, but while heuristics may play a role, preference heterogeneity is also important. Our most flexible models find an insignificant heuristic effect. In part because holding context fixed, this heuristic is observationally equivalent to extreme price sensitivity.
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Volume (Year): 102 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, 2015.
"Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 97(3), pages 667-682, July.
- Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, 2012. "Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange," NBER Working Papers 18089, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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