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Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements

Author

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  • Viral V. Acharya
  • Peter DeMarzo
  • Ilan Kremer

Abstract

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don't know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns. (JEL D21, D83, G12, G14, L11)

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V. Acharya & Peter DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer, 2011. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2955-2979, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:7:p:2955-79
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Grenadier, Steven R. & Malenko, Andrey & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2014. "Investment busts, reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 137-157.
    2. Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
    3. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    4. Ertimur, Yonca & Sletten, Ewa & Sunder, Jayanthi, 2014. "Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 79-95.
    5. Waters, James, 2015. "Optimal design and consequences of financial disclosure regulation: a real options approach," MPRA Paper 63369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ilan Guttman & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2014. "Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2400-2420, August.
    7. Athanasakou, Vasiliki E. & Strong, Norman C & Walker, Martin, 2014. "The relative concentration of bad versus good news flows," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60139, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure," 2014 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Miles Gietzmann & Adam Ostaszewski, 2014. "Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-45, February.
    10. Correia, Ricardo & Dubiel-Teleszynski, Tomasz Piotr & Población García, Francisco Javier, 2017. "A structural model to study the bail-out process in a bank and its macro-prudential policy implications," Working Paper Series 2110, European Central Bank.
    11. Steven Grenadier & Andrey Malenko & Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2012. "Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd," NBER Working Papers 17945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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