The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets with Imperfect Enforcement
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Hilary Sigman & Howard F. Chang, 2011. "The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets With Imperfect Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 16860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram, 2012. "The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number full10-1.
- Emilson Silva & Xie Zhu, 2008. "Global trading of carbon dioxide permits with noncompliant polluters," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 430-459, August.
- Markus Ohndorf, 2010. "Optimal Monitoring for project-based Emissions Trading Systems under incomplete Enforcement," IED Working paper 10-13, IED Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich.
- Hilary Sigman, 2011. "Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy," NBER Chapters,in: The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy, pages 213-225 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
- James B. Bushnell, 2011. "The Economics of Carbon Offsets," NBER Chapters,in: The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy, pages 197-209 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 1999. "Voluntary Compliance with Market-Based Environmental Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 998-1033, October.
- A. Denny Ellerman & Nick Johnstone & Friedrich Schneider & Alexander F. Wagner & Juan-Pablo Montero & Johann Wackerbauer, 2003. "Tradable Permits," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(1), pages 3-32, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram, 2011. "Introduction and Summary to "The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy"," NBER Chapters,in: The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy, pages 1-17 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2012.
"Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 180-203, October.
- Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2011. "Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 11/152, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Don Fullerton & Catherine Wolfram, 2011. "The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy: An Introduction," NBER Working Papers 17499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:268-72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.