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An Automated Approach for Enhancing Efficiency and Transparency in Student Selection Process for Public Sector General Universities

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  • Kashif Shaikh*, Yasir Arfat Malkani, Yasir Mehboob Rind

    (Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Sindh, Jamshoro)

Abstract

The admission process in public sector universities in Pakistan faces challenges, including a large volume of applications, complex eligibility criteria, and the need for equitable seat allocation across various quotas. Many public sector universities still rely on manualor semi-automated admission systems, which result in inefficiencies related to timeand transparency. Furthermore, these systems are vulnerable to errors in the seat allocation processdue to human involvement at certain stages.To address these issues, this paper proposes a fully automated admission systemfor public sector general universities. The system is developed and implemented at the University of Sindh, Jamshoro, one of Pakistan’s oldest and largest public sector universities. Following the successful implementation of the system, a performance evaluationand comparative analysisare conducted to assess its effectiveness and confirm its feasibility for all public sector general universities in Pakistan.Additionally, a usability studyis carried out to ensure the system's flexibility and ease of use from the user's perspective. The results from the usability studyand comparison indicate that the proposed system outperforms existing systems in terms of flexibility, reliability, efficiency, and transparency

Suggested Citation

  • Kashif Shaikh*, Yasir Arfat Malkani, Yasir Mehboob Rind, 2025. "An Automated Approach for Enhancing Efficiency and Transparency in Student Selection Process for Public Sector General Universities," International Journal of Innovations in Science & Technology, 50sea, vol. 7(6), pages 44-63, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:abq:ijist1:v:7:y:2025:i:6:p:44-63
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    References listed on IDEAS

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