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Citations for "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring"

by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris

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  1. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  2. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005.
  4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, 05.
  5. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  6. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010. "Plausible Cooperation,Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2012.
  7. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
  9. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
  10. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
  11. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org.
  12. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1449, Econometric Society.
  14. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2010. "Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 337-340, September.
  16. Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  18. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2008. "Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002307, David K. Levine.
  19. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  20. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  21. Cho, Myeonghwan, 2011. "Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 280-282, September.
  22. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  23. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  24. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Aldy, Joseph E., 2012. "Designing a Bretton Woods Institution to Address Climate Change," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government rwp12-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  26. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  27. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
  28. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  29. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  30. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  31. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  32. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  33. V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, . "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
  34. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  35. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  36. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  37. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
  38. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  39. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
  40. Johannes Horner & Olivier Gossner, 2007. "Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence," 2007 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 860, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  41. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo Group Munich.
  42. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
  43. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  44. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  45. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
  46. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  47. Zheng, Bingyong, 2008. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 406-416, May.