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Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

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  • Takizawa, Shinichiro
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    Abstract

    We investigate the value of delaying the punishment in private monitoring repeated games with almost-public information when players use a grim trigger strategy. If the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered, the equilibrium set would change.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-5070DCD-2/2/48bb798c3a254597c97b62663d089bb7
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 108 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 337-340

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:337-340

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

    Related research

    Keywords: Private information Repeated games Decisions under uncertainty Irreversibility Trigger strategy;

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    1. Yuliy Sannikov, 2007. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1285-1329, 09.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
    4. Thijssen, J.J.J. & Huisman, K.J.M. & Kort, P.M., 2004. "The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-140877, Tilburg University.
    5. Gonzalo Cortazar & Eduardo S. Schwartz & Marcelo Salinas, 1998. "Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1059-1070, August.
    6. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-242, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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