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How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment

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  • Jingjing Zhang
  • Marco Casari

Abstract

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals�. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group.

Suggested Citation

  • Jingjing Zhang & Marco Casari, 2010. "How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment," IEW - Working Papers 506, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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