A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly
AbstractWe normally take it for granted: a government or state has its corresponding territory. This paper shows that government need not have a territorial monopoly. The paper advances a practical, constitutional proposal, based on the notion that there are meaningful government units, whose major characteristic is not the territorial extension but its function. The constitution proposal allows for the emergence of governmental organizations, which will be called FOCJ according to the acronym for "Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions”. Their territory is variable, and they do not have a territorial monopoly over it. Rather, they are in competition with other such FOCJ, and they are, moreover, exposed to political competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 047.
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federalism; constitutional economics; public choice; monopoly on territory;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey, 2001. "A Utopia? Government Without Territorial Monopoly," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 162-, March.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
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- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
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- Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-327, September.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-42, May.
- Breton,Albert, 1996. "Competitive Governments," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521481021, November.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1994. " The Political Economy of Centralization and the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 151-90, October.
- Bird, Richard M., 1993. "Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 46(2), pages 207-27, June Cita.
- Bruno Frey, 2013. "European unification: a new proposal," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 285-294, December.
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