A New Concept of European Federalism
AbstractBy opening markets the European union has been also an economic success. However, with respect to political organization the European Union is far less accomplished. The misguided concept of a successful Europe consists in mistaking integration for harmonization and homogenization. But the essence of Europe is its diversity. No steps have been taken to actively institutionalize competition between governmental units at all levels. The welfare of European citizens could be improved by promoting competition between new jurisdictions. A new type of federalism based on Functional, Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions FOCJ is here proposed. FOCJ form a federal system of governments emerging from below as a response to citizens' preferences. The lowest political units (communes) must be given the freedom to engage in forming FOCJ and must have the right to levy taxes to finance the public services they provide.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Institute, LSE in its series LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series with number 03.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
federalism; constitutional economics; public choice; monopoly on territory;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "A New Concept of European Federalism," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 3, London School of Economics / European Institute.
- Bruno S. Frey, 2009. "A new concept of European federalism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 53366, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-03-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EUR-2010-03-28 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-PBE-2010-03-28 (Public Economics)
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