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Sind Wettbewerbe im Profisport Rattenrennen?

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  • Budzinski, Oliver

Abstract

Eine Reihe von Autoren - vor allem im deutschsprachigen - Raum begründet die Notwendigkeit regulatorischer Eingriffe in Profisportmärkte damit, dass der Wettbewerb auf diesen Märkten systematisch versage. Als wesentliche Ursache für Wettbewerbsprobleme innerhalb dieser Ligen oder Meisterschaften gilt dem-nach das Auftreten eines ruinösen Wettbewerbs in Form von Rattenrennen à la Akerlof. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Frage, ob Rattenrennenmodelle eine geeignete Erklärung des ökonomischen Wettbewerbs in einer Sportliga darstellen und legt regulatorische Implikationen dar.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver, 2017. "Sind Wettbewerbe im Profisport Rattenrennen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 104, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rattenrennen; ruinöse Konkurrenz; Wettbewerb; Medienrechte; Sportökonomik; Zentralvermarktung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General
    • Z23 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Finance
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • Z22 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Labor Issues

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