Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Evolutionary norm enforcement

Contents:

Author Info

  • Güth, Werner
  • Ockenfels, Axel

Abstract

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of truly trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/61708/1/722412185.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 1999,84.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199984

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Spandauer Str. 1,10178 Berlin
Phone: +49-30-2093-5708
Fax: +49-30-2093-5617
Email:
Web page: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  2. Gueth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1993-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  4. Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997. "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1997-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2000. "An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 90-116, October.
  6. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 1994. "Competition Or Co-Operation: On The Evolutionary Economics Of Trust, Exploitation And Moral Attitudes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 155-187, 06.
  7. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
  8. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  9. John C Harsanyi, 1997. "Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1175, David K. Levine.
  10. Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-86, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. G Th, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 155-174, December.
  2. Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 2001. "Langzeiteffekte der Theory of Games and Economic Behavior: Zur Anwendung der Spieltheorie in den (Sozial-)wissenschaften," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,8, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  3. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. Axel Ockenfels, 2008. "Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 41, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  5. Werner Güth & Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 265-282, November.
  6. Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  7. Croson, Rachel & Konow, James, 2007. "Double Standards: Social Preferences and Moral Biases," MPRA Paper 2729, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Edward Castronova, . "Achievement Bias in the Evolution of Preferences," Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology, Berkeley Electronic Press 2-1-1010, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  9. Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels & Werner Güth, 2006. "The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness on EBay. An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2006-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  10. Edward Castronova, 2004. "Achievement Bias in the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 195-226, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199984. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.