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Verdienen Manager, was sie verdienen? Eine wirtschaftsethische Stellungnahme

Author

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  • Pies, Ingo
  • Sass, Peter

Abstract

In der öffentlichen Diskussion werden die Bezüge von Führungskräften mit der Semantik der Leistungsgerechtigkeit bewertet. Allerdings zeigt eine detaillierte Analyse von Prinzipal-Agent-Problemen in der modernen Wirtschaft, dass eine leistungsgerechte Entlohnung oft nicht das beste Ergebnis hervorruft. Daher schlagen wir vor, eine alternative Semantik bei der Festlegung und Bewertung der Managerentlohnung zu verwenden: Verfahrensgerechtigkeit. Die Verwendung dieser Semantik im öffentlichen Diskurs führt zu glaubwürdigeren Argumenten und höherer Akzeptanz der Managerentlohnung in der Bevölkerung.

Suggested Citation

  • Pies, Ingo & Sass, Peter, 2010. "Verdienen Manager, was sie verdienen? Eine wirtschaftsethische Stellungnahme," Discussion Papers 2010-4, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:20104
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    Cited by:

    1. Pies, Ingo, 2011. "Der wirtschaftsethische Imperativ lautet: Denkfehler vermeiden! Sieben Lektionen des ordonomischen Forschungsprogramms," Discussion Papers 2011-7, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    2. Pies, Ingo & Sass, Peter, 2011. "Wie sollte die Managementvergütung (nicht) reguliert werden? Ordnungspolitische Überlegungen zur Haftungsbeschränkung von und in Organisationen," Discussion Papers 2011-2, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    3. Pies Ingo & Sass Peter, 2011. "Wie sollte die Managementvergütung (nicht) reguliert werden? – Ordnungspolitische Überlegungen zur Haftungsbeschränkung von und in Organisationen / How Managerial Compensation Should (not) be Regulate," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 231-268, January.
    4. Pies, Ingo, 2011. "Die zwei Pathologien der Moderne: Eine ordonomische Argumentationsskizze," Discussion Papers 2011-14, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Managerentlohnung; Innovationen; Leistungsgerechtigkeit; Verfahrensgerechtigkeit; öffentlicher Diskurs; Executive Compensation; Innovations; Pay for Performance; Public Discourse;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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