R&D cooperation and industry cartelization
AbstractThe objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of R&D cooperation on cartel formation in the product market. The R&D investments that precede the production process are aimed at the reduction of the unit manufacturing costs, and could create positive externalities for the potential competitors. In contrast to the preceding literature, we assume that the competition between firms on the product market takes place according to the Stackelberg leadership model. For simplicity we focus on the case of duopoly. Numerical analysis shows that a closer cooperation at the R&D stage may strengthen the incentives to create a cartel in the product market. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2013-41.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
R&D cooperation of firms; industry cartelization; Stackelberg competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-08-31 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2013-08-31 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-IND-2013-08-31 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2013-08-31 (Innovation)
- NEP-TID-2013-08-31 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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