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R&D cooperation and industry cartelization

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  • Prokop, Jacek
  • Karbowski, Adam

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of R&D cooperation on cartel formation in the product market. The R&D investments that precede the production process are aimed at the reduction of the unit manufacturing costs, and could create positive externalities for the potential competitors. In contrast to the preceding literature, we assume that the competition between firms on the product market takes place according to the Stackelberg leadership model. For simplicity we focus on the case of duopoly. Numerical analysis shows that a closer cooperation at the R&D stage may strengthen the incentives to create a cartel in the product market. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2013-41.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201341

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Keywords: R&D cooperation of firms; industry cartelization; Stackelberg competition;

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  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
  2. De Bondt, Raymond & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1991. "Strategic investment with spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 345-366, October.
  3. Prokop, Jacek, 2011. "Powstawanie i stabilność karteli heterogenicznych
    [The emergence and stability of heterogeneous cartels]
    ," MPRA Paper 43712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Prokop, Jacek, 1999. "Process of dominant-cartel formation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 241-257, February.
  5. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond, 1984. "Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 117-132, June.
  6. Kaiser, Ulrich, 2002. "An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the German service sector," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 747-774, June.
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