Job protection renders minimum wages less harmful
AbstractIndividual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2011/14.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Minimum wages; unemployment; hidden information; labour market regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-10-09 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2011-10-09 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2011-10-09 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
- NEP-REG-2011-10-09 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Caliendo, Marco & Fossen, Frank M. & Kritikos, Alexander S., 2011.
"Personality characteristics and the decision to become and stay self-employed,"
2011/9, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Caliendo, Marco & Fossen, Frank M. & Kritikos, Alexander S., 2011. "Personality Characteristics and the Decision to Become and Stay Self-Employed," IZA Discussion Papers 5566, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Marco Caliendo & Frank M. Fossen & Alexander S. Kritikos, 2011. "Personality Characteristics and the Decision to Become and Stay Self-Employed," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 369, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Marco Caliendo & Frank M. Fossen & Alexander S. Kritikos, 2011. "Personality Characteristics and the Decision to Become and Stay Self-Employed," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1113, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2003.
"The Economics of Employment Protection,"
Journal of Labor Research,
Transaction Publishers, vol. 24(1), pages 85-129, January.
- Kugler, Adriana & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2004.
"How do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July.
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