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Do hedge funds manage their reported returns?

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  • Agarwal, Vikas
  • Daniel, Naveen D.
  • Naik, Narayan Y.
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    Abstract

    For funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than those during the rest of the year even after controlling for risk in both time-series and the cross-section; (ii) this December spike is greater than that for funds with lower incentives and opportunities to inflate returns. These results suggest that hedge funds manage their returns upwards in an opportunistic fashion in order to earn higher fees. Finally, we provide strong evidence that funds inflate December returns by under-reporting returns earlier in the year but only weak evidence that funds borrow from January returns in the following year. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) in its series CFR Working Papers with number 07-09.

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    Date of creation: 2009
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:0709

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