IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bofitp/bdp2020_024.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Gulags, crime, and elite violence: Origins and consequences of the Russian mafia

Author

Listed:
  • Lonsky, Jakub

Abstract

This paper studies the origins and consequences of the Russian mafia (vory-v-zakone). I web scraped a unique dataset that contains detailed biographies of more than 5,000 mafia leaders operating in 15 countries of the (former) Soviet Union at some point between 1916 and 2017. Using this data, I first show that the Russian mafia originated in the Gulag - the Soviet system of forced labor camps which housed around 18 million prisoners in the 1920s1950s period. Second, I document that the distance to the nearest camp is a strong negative predictor of mafia presence in Russia's communities in the early post-Soviet period. Finally, using an instrumental variable approach which exploits the spatial distribution of the gulags, I examine the effects of mafia presence on local crime and elite violence in mid-1990s Russia. In particular, I show that the communities with mafia presence experienced a dramatic rise in crime driven by turf wars which erupted among rival clans around 1993 and persisted for much of the 1990s. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that mafia presence led to a spike in attacks against businessmen, fellow criminals, as well as law enforcement officers and judges, while politically-motivated violence remained unaffected.

Suggested Citation

  • Lonsky, Jakub, 2020. "Gulags, crime, and elite violence: Origins and consequences of the Russian mafia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:bdp2020_024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/240375/1/dp2024.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Tarek A. Hassan & James A. Robinson, 2011. "Social Structure and Development: A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 895-946.
    3. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
    4. Barone, Guglielmo & Narciso, Gaia, 2015. "Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 98-110.
    5. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2007. "Institutional Quality and International Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 791-819.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
    7. Nikolova, Milena & Popova, Olga & Otrachshenko, Vladimir, 2022. "Stalin and the origins of mistrust," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    8. Ruben Enikolopov & Maria Petrova & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3253-3285, December.
    9. Peri Giovanni, 2004. "Socio-Cultural Variables and Economic Success: Evidence from Italian Provinces 1951-1991," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-36, September.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo Davide De Luca, 2020. "Weak States: Causes and Consequences of the Sicilian Mafia," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 537-581.
    11. José Luis Montiel Olea & Carolin Pflueger, 2013. "A Robust Test for Weak Instruments," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 358-369, July.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    13. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
    14. Dimico, Arcangelo & Isopi, Alessia & Olsson, Ola, 2017. "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1083-1115, December.
    15. Melissa Dell, 2015. "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1738-1779, June.
    16. Alberto Alesina & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Pinotti, 2019. "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 457-499.
    17. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    18. Murphy, Tommy E. & Rossi, Martín A., 2020. "Following the poppy trail: Origins and consequences of Mexican drug cartels," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    19. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
    20. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Privatization in Russia: First Steps," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 137-164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369.
    22. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    23. Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2015. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian†American Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 256-288, August.
    24. Daniele, Gianmarco & Dipoppa, Gemma, 2017. "Mafia, elections and violence against politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 10-33.
    25. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    26. Ernesto Dal Bo & Rafael Di Tella, 2003. "Capture by Threat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1123-1152, October.
    27. Paolo Pinotti, 2015. "The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 203-232, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Toews, Gerhard & Vezina, Pierre-Louis, 2020. "Enemies of the people," SocArXiv gnypr, Center for Open Science.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:zbw:bofitp:2020_024 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lonsky, Jakub, 2020. "Gulags, crime, and elite violence : origins and consequences of the Russian mafia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2020, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    3. Paolo Buonanno & Irene Ferrari & Alessandro Saia, 2023. "ALL IS NOT LOST: Organized Crime and Social Capital Formation," Working Papers 2023: 16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2024.
    4. Marco Le Moglie & Giuseppe Sorrenti, 2022. "Revealing "Mafia Inc."? Financial Crisis, Organized Crime, and the Birth of New Enterprises," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 142-156, March.
    5. Luigi Balletta & Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2019. "The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia," Discussion Papers 2019/242, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    6. Giovanni Bernardo & Irene Brunetti & Mehmet Pinar & Thanasis Stengos, 2021. "Measuring the presence of organized crime across Italian provinces: a sensitivity analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 31-95, February.
    7. Francesca Maria Calamunci & Federico Fabio Frattini, 2023. "When Crime Tears Communities Apart: Social Capital and Organised Crime," Working Papers 2023.08, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Cavalieri, Marina & Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo & Guccio, Calogero, 2023. "Organised crime and educational outcomes in Southern Italy: An empirical investigation," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    9. Nicola Mastrorocco, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep1018, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    10. Gianmarco Daniele & Gemma Dipoppa, 2018. "Doing Business Below the Line: Screening, Mafias and Public Funds," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1898, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Pierfrancesco Rolla & Patricia Justino, 2022. "The social consequences of organized crime in Italy," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-106, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Paolo Pinotti, 0. "The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 0, pages 1-14.
    13. Liu, Xianda & Hou, Wenxuan & Main, Brian G.M., 2022. "Anti-market sentiment and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from anti-Jewish pogroms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Fuchs-Schündeln, N. & Hassan, T.A., 2016. "Natural Experiments in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 923-1012, Elsevier.
    15. Bennett, Daniel L. & Faria, Hugo J. & Gwartney, James D. & Morales, Daniel R., 2017. "Economic Institutions and Comparative Economic Development: A Post-Colonial Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 503-519.
    16. Kato, Atsushi & Sato, Takahiro, 2013. "Threats to property rights: Effects on economic performance of the manufacturing sector in Indian states," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 65-81.
    17. Litterio Mirenda & Sauro Mocetti & Lucia Rizzica, 2019. "The real effects of 'ndrangheta: firm-level evidence," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1235, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    18. Daron Acemoglu & Giuseppe De Feo & Giacomo Davide De Luca, 2020. "Weak States: Causes and Consequences of the Sicilian Mafia," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 537-581.
    19. Bhattacharyya, Sambit, 2012. "Trade liberalization and institutional development," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 253-269.
    20. Michele Battisti & Giovanni Bernardo & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Giuseppe Maggio, 2019. "Shooting down the price: evidence from mafia homicides and housing market volatility," Working Paper series 19-05, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    21. Ng, Travis & Yu, Linhui, 2014. "Which types of institutions hinder productivity among private manufacturing firms in China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 17-31.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Russian mafia; Gulag; Post-socialist transition; Crime; Elite violence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:bdp2020_024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bofitfi.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.