The environmental protection authority as a monopoly
AbstractSmall jurisdictions vie for economic development by relaxing pollution controls. This can cause damaging spillovers. Many policy analysts recommend replacing the small jurisdictions with a single authority that taxes development. But as the sole producer of development rights to a unique area, the authority will permit less development than is Pareto- efficient. Whether it can sustain monopoly power depends upon the form of its tax on development. Periodic taxes (such as annual property taxes) will sustain market power longer than will onetime taxes (such as those on transfer of ownership). Rather than create a monopoly, one can create an authority that taxes small jurisdictions for spillovers but otherwise lets them compete
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Date of creation: 20 Oct 1998
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land use; environmental protection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-12-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-1998-12-09 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-12-09 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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