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The environmental protection authority as a monopoly

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  • Leon Taylor

    (Dillard University)

Abstract

Small jurisdictions vie for economic development by relaxing pollution controls. This can cause damaging spillovers. Many policy analysts recommend replacing the small jurisdictions with a single authority that taxes development. But as the sole producer of development rights to a unique area, the authority will permit less development than is Pareto- efficient. Whether it can sustain monopoly power depends upon the form of its tax on development. Periodic taxes (such as annual property taxes) will sustain market power longer than will onetime taxes (such as those on transfer of ownership). Rather than create a monopoly, one can create an authority that taxes small jurisdictions for spillovers but otherwise lets them compete

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9810007.

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Date of creation: 20 Oct 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9810007

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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: land use; environmental protection;

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  1. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
  2. Frech, H. III & Lafferty, Ronald N., 1984. "The effect of the California Coastal Commission on housing prices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 105-123, July.
  3. Hanushek, Eric A & Quigley, John M, 1990. "Commercial Land Use Regulation and Local Government Finance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 176-80, May.
  4. W. Patrick Beaton, 1991. "The Impact of Regional Land-Use Controls on Property Values: The Case of the New Jersey Pinelands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(2), pages 172-194.
  5. Parsons, George R., 1992. "The effect of coastal land use restrictions on housing prices: A repeat sale analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-37, January.
  6. Brito, Dagobert L & Oakland, William H, 1980. "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 691-704, September.
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