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Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections

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Author Info
John W. Patty (Carnegie Mellon University)
Abstract

I explore a behavioral model of political participation, first introduced by Quattrone and Tversky [1988], based on the primitives of prospect theory, as defined by Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. The model offers an alternative explanation for why the President’s party tends to lose seats in midterm congressional elections. The model is examined empirically and compared against competing explanations for the “midterm phenomenon”.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0502/0502007.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0502007.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 16 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502007

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 40
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Loss aversion; midterm elections; congressional elections; negative voting; midterm effect;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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