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Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty

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  • Mauricio Bugarin

    (University of Brasilia)

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    Abstract

    The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9811/9811001.ps.gz
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9811001.

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    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 06 Nov 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001

    Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public Choice
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    Web page: http://128.118.178.162

    Related research

    Keywords: Vote splitting; uncertainty; insurance;

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    1. Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 343-69, October.
    2. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
    5. Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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