This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mauricio Bugarin (University of Brasilia)
Abstract

The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9811/9811001.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9811/9811001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9811001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 06 Nov 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811001

Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 29; figures: included. Forthcoming in Public Choice
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: Vote splitting; uncertainty; insurance;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 343-69, October.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS was sponsored from 1997 to 2002 by the Université du Québec à Montréal.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.