An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
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- Heckelman, Jac C., 2000. "Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, May.
- Galina Zudenkova, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," Economics Working Papers we1011, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Mauricio Bugarin, 1998. "Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 9811001, EconWPA.
- Stephen Calabrese, 2007. "An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 23-40, January.
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